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Abstract
Spain is an acute example of severe yet permissive border 
control where institutional frameworks ensure that migrant 
labour inexpensively fills existing labour shortages and 
highly exploitative “niches,” while aiding a broader flex-
ibilization strategy . Through a review of mainly Spanish 
research by trade union, industrial relations, and immi-
gration specialists on three major migrant employment 
sectors, the article shows that impacts on employment and 
wage levels have been limited, despite claims to the con-
trary, although they have been deeper in those employment 
sectors with reduced legal protection and union organiza-
tion . It concludes that while the Spanish case gives sup-
port to the No Borders position, it also exposes the need 
for greater engagement with migrant workers by the trade 
unions and rejects the major Spanish union federations’ 
recent advocacy of “controlled immigration .”
Résumé
L’Espagne est un exemple aigu d’un contrôle rigoureux 
quoique permissif des frontières où les cadres institution-
nels font en sorte que les travailleurs migrants comblent à 
peu de frais les pénuries de main-d’œuvre existantes et les 
créneaux susceptibles d’une forte exploitation, tout en faci-
litant une stratégie de d’assouplissement étendue . À tra-
vers  un examen de la recherche principalement espagnole 
sur les trois principaux secteurs de l’emploi des migrants 
par des experts en syndicalisme, relations industrielles et 
immigration, l’auteur montre qu’en dépit d’affirmations a 
contrario les effets sur les niveaux d’emploi et les salaires 
ont été limités, bien qu’ils se soient fait sentir plus profon-
dément dans les secteurs de l’emploi où la protection juri-
dique et l’organisation syndicale demeurent insuffisantes . 
En guise de conclusion, l’auteur soutient que si le cas de 
l’Espagne conforte la position du mouvement No Border, il 
fait néanmoins ressortir la nécessité d’un plus grand enga-
gement auprès des travailleurs migrants de la part des syn-
dicats et va à l’encontre du plaidoyer récent des grandes 
fédérations syndicales espagnoles en faveur de « l’immigra-
tion contrôlée » .
Introduction
In this article I will attempt to add to the debate on the valid-
ity of the No Borders thesis by analyzing a polemical area 
among progressive analysts: the impact of controlled migra-
tion on labour conditions—of both migrant and non-migrant 
workers .1 My contribution will take the form of a national 
case study, that of the Spanish State,2 in which a combina-
tion of strictness and permissiveness in border control has 
combined with specific legislative constraints to shape the 
labour and self-organization of migrants, inserted into an 
unfavourable context of extensive informal employment and 
precarious labour relations . This, as we shall explore, has 
been a factor contributing to growing anti-immigrant atti-
tudes in Spanish society and even large-scale racist attacks . 
In response, a significant level of debate has emerged within 
the trade unions and the mainstream and radical left about 
the effects of migration on the poorer classes .
My method shall be to contextualize the subject within 
the actuality of migrant employment and policy and then 
critically interpret several recent Spanish studies dealing 
with impacts on pay and employment . These include a study 
on the trade unions and migration, “Los sindicatos ante 
la inmigración,” directed by Carmen González-Enríquez 
for the government-attached Observatorio Permanente de 
la Inmigración (Permanent Observatory of Immigration, 
OPI) which concludes with a negative assessment of the 
effect of migrants on the employment and conditions of 
non-migrants and supports the two main union federations’ 
current defence of “controlled immigration .”3 I also explore 
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research by Miguel Pajares, the ex-coordinator for migrant 
services (CITE) at the Catalan Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) 
federation, which, in contrast, identified a negligible nega-
tive effect .4
In accord with Pajares, I shall demonstrate, through inter-
pretation of the range of sources, that the negative effects 
associated with migrant employment are exaggerated; and 
that controls, rather than benefiting the socio-economic 
conditions of working people, allow for the super-exploit-
ation of migrant labour and facilitate the undercutting of 
labour as a whole . I end by reaffirming that migrant labour 
is itself a key subject in determining labour outcomes, and 
advocating locating the organization of migrant labour at 
the centre of trade-union strategies .
Migrant Labour in Spain
Large-scale immigration into Spain is a relatively new phe-
nomenon (at least under capitalism) . In a similar way to 
other Mediterranean countries (and Ireland), Spain was 
until recently a net source of migration—with large numbers 
of people emigrating to northern Europe and other regions . 
In 1996, of the total population only 1 .5 per cent (600,000 
persons) were foreign-born, of which half were from other 
European countries . Linked to Spain’s relatively substantial 
economic growth (of 4 .1 per cent annually between 1996 
and 2000; and 3 .1 per cent from 2001 to 2005),5 the foreign 
population has increased markedly to currently represent 
around 12 per cent of the total Spanish population . Within 
the Spanish workforce, migrant workers represent 14 .3 per 
cent (2 .9 million) of the total .6 This is a relatively quick and 
pronounced transformation for an economically developed 
country by today’s standards .
A large number of foreign residents in Spain are EU cit-
izens (between a third and a half of the total foreign popu-
lation in 20057), of which a significant group are relatively 
wealthy, often retired citizens from northern Europe—in 
2005 British and German citizens were numerically the 
fifth and seventh largest foreign collectives in Spain .8 These 
immigrants are normally not treated as such in discus-
sions on the topic in Spain, although their numbers are 
included in media and academic studies on the extension 
of migration and migrant labour in Spain . In this study I 
shall follow standard Spanish practice and not refer to west-
ern Europeans when I refer to “migrants” or “immigrants,” 
although I am conscious that this creates definitional 
issues, for example a possible reinforcing of perceptions of 
migrants as “low wage” and “low skilled .” When I use fig-
ures that include Europeans, I shall refer to the population 
in question as “foreign .”
Despite the continued arrival of these more affluent 
groups on Spanish territory, Spain’s foreign population has 
diversified to progressively integrate more migrants from 
the “Global South” and Eastern Europe . Consequently, in 
2005, the first four largest groups of resident non-Span-
iards were, in order of size, Moroccans (505,400 per-
sons), Ecuadorians (491,800), Romanians (314,300), and 
Colombians (268,900 .)9
Before the current crisis, which has been especially 
severe in the Spanish case, migration into Spain was fre-
quently presented as an economic success story in both 
international and Spanish political, business, and media 
circles . Several studies have shown migrant labour to have 
been fundamental to Spain’s economic expansion . Spanish 
GDP per capita increased by 2 .6 per cent between 1995 
and 2005, and an investigation by the Caixa de Catalunya 
bank found that without migration, GDP per capita would 
have contracted by -1 .17 per cent . The economic office of 
Spanish president Luís Rodríguez Zapatero has estimated 
that migrant workers (and their contributions to the social-
security system) had produced as much as 51 .6 per cent of 
economic growth from 2001 to 2005 .10 These are dramatic 
figures by any standards .
Nevertheless Spanish economic strategy had centred 
on traditional low-capital-investment sectors (such as 
construction, agriculture, and tourism), in which migrant 
labour has played a significant role . Since the collapse in 
2008 of an enormous housing bubble, which coincided with 
the international banking crisis, these sectors have encoun-
tered serious difficulties and have shed large numbers of 
jobs . This is especially so in the construction sector . One 
consequence has been that migrant unemployment rose by 
64 per cent in the year before the last quarter of 2008 .11 A 
year later (in mid-2009) 28 per cent of all “foreigners” were 
unemployed—a notably higher figure than for “natives” (16 
per cent) .12
Even prior to the downturn the migrant population was 
in a precarious socio-economic position . Most of its mem-
bers arrived shortly after a successful drive (initiated by the 
social-democratic PSOE government of Felipe González 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s) to “flexibilize” large sec-
tions of the workforce, as a result of which Spain is among 
the countries with the highest proportion of “temporary” 
employment among the states included in the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) . It is 
also a country with a large (and officially tolerated) under-
ground economy which is estimated as accounting for 25 
per cent of Spain’s Gross National Product (GNP) .13 It is 
into the above employment context that migrant labour has 
been incorporated .
Real differences that exist between the migrant workforce 
and the Spanish-born workforce have been exploited by pol-
iticians taking a populist stance (in particular those from 
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the right-wing Popular Party, or PP) and sections of the 
media . This has encouraged a negative sentiment towards 
immigration in Spanish society . In recent years, monthly 
surveys on public opinion by the sociological research body, 
the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), have fre-
quently identified “immigration” to be one of the biggest 
national “problems .” At times, such as in September 2006 
when a sizable number of undocumented migrants arrived 
by boat in the Canary Islands, it figured as the number one 
problem by 60 per cent of those interviewed .14
There have also been cases of substantial racist violence 
in different points of the peninsula . The worst example 
was a local pogrom against North African migrants which 
occurred on 6 February 2000 in the Andalusian agricultural 
town of El Ejido . In this, 374 immigrants reported being 
physically attacked and 221 losing their homes, making the 
incident the most serious of its kind in Europe for decades .15
The subsequent media and academic attention given to 
the event unearthed the conditions in which a large num-
ber of migrants were working and living in Spain . In the 
area near El Ejido, 9,000 farms had adopted an economic-
ally successful method of farming horticultural products in 
high-temperature plastic greenhouses, in an area among the 
hottest in Europe .16 Seventy per cent of the migrant work-
force employed in the installations proved to be undocu-
mented .17 Fixed-term contracts and low wages were the 
norm .18 Migrants were discovered to be living away from 
the town in shacks or amongst ruins, lacking basic amen-
ities such as water and public transport .19 The flip side was 
that the business model was extremely lucrative for the local 
native farmers, and the region transformed from one of the 
poorest per capita in Europe to one of the richest .20
It was also highly segregated and the local mayor (PP) 
made clear that he backed this, stating, “Immigrants are 
good for the municipality while they are working, but they 
must take the bus and leave at seven in the evening .”21 In 
a context of “apartheid-style” inequality, segregation, and 
attitudes,22 a killing of a local woman by a mentally unstable 
Moroccan sparked the violence described .23
There were two interesting and, it could be argued, related 
responses to the events that are relevant to the present dis-
cussion . Firstly, local migrant workers reacted by holding a 
general strike, occurring in the middle of harvesting and 
eventually costing the employers millions of euros . After 
eight days of strike action, negotiations between unions, 
NGOs, political authorities, and farmers’ associations 
agreed to provide emergency housing, public transport, 
and compensation for damages, as well as improving wages 
and conditions . This was initially an example of successful 
union mobilization by migrants and it encouraged further 
strikes by immigrant agricultural workers, including in 
Catalonia . However the North Africans received threats (as 
did NGOs that had defended them), and were openly dis-
criminated against in employment . As a result, almost all 
abandoned the region,24 and the agreements reached were 
not implemented .
The other significant event in relation to the conflict was 
that in the following months the PP government passed 
a new Aliens Law (Ley de Extranjería), which, among 
other restrictive measures, removed the right of irregular 
migrants to hold meetings, join “associations” (including 
unions), demonstrate, or strike . There was much public 
discussion about whether this was “unconstitutional,” and 
a left-wing Catalan nationalist suggested in Congress that 
it would turn all migrants into “cheap labour .”25 A sup-
porter of the new law, the president of the governmental 
Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, Mikel 
Azurmendi, who led an investigation into the El Ejido vio-
lence,26 would later say of the previous law, “With the right 
to assemble, demonstrate and strike in their hands, [ … ] 
that immigrant mass [ … ] in [Almería and the Canaries] 
would be a grave factor in social destabilisation and ser-
ious conflicts .”27 This can be interpreted as an extreme 
and transparent advocacy of employing migrants without 
rights, which in the context of the abuses uncovered in El 
Ejido has serious implications .
Government Policy and Application
The political responses to El Ejido outlined imply at least 
that high levels of exploitation of migrant labour have been 
tolerated and encouraged by legislation .28 There is other evi-
dence that reinforces this proposition, relating to the role of 
borders in shaping employment patterns . Before attempting 
an analysis of this, it is useful to describe the situation on 
Spain’s border .
Spain’s southern border with Africa has been the site of 
many tragedies in recent years . As surveillance and patrols 
(by both Spain and the EU) have been reinforced around 
the western Mediterranean, and “migratory control” bilat-
eral agreements have been reached between Spain/the EU 
and nearby North African countries, migrants have been 
travelling in flimsy boats from as far away as Senegal—over 
1,000 kilometres away . The result has been a multiplication 
of the number of deaths, particularly in the Atlantic Ocean 
around the Canary Islands, where 6,000 people died in 2006, 
according to the Canarian regional government .29 There 
also have been more dramatic cases of migrants being shot 
dead by security forces while trying to cross the high fences 
surrounding the Spanish North-African enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla, and the Spanish State has received criticisms 
for having a restrictive asylum policy: out of 2,504 requests 
for asylum in the first six months of 2006, the state rejected 
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or declared inadmissible 2,165, an acceptance rate of only 
13 .5 per cent .30
The described events might suggest that the Spanish 
State has a “tough” border policy, which both conserva-
tive and Socialist governments have repeatedly claimed 
is the case . Nonetheless, large numbers of undocumented 
migrants have continued to enter the country, and even 
since an extensive regularization process in 2005, the min-
ister for immigration and labour, Celestino Corbacho, has 
acknowledged the existence of 700,000 irregular workers 
in the country (a figure which the PP opposition raises to 
1 .6 million) .31 Even the government’s lower figures show a 
large pool of undocumented migrants for a country with a 
population of approximately 45 million . Furthermore, there 
are signs that many are long-term: one CIS study discovered 
that 42 per cent of all “irregulares” had resided in Spain for 
six to ten years .32
Clearly Spain’s borders are permeable, and local police 
authorities have even affirmed that they have only symbolic 
impact .33 There are also indications that this widespread 
irregularity is not merely due to the difficulty of sealing a 
country’s borders in today’s globalized world . As well as 
large numbers of Latin Americans entering Spain with 
tourist or study visas (which has converted Latinos into the 
largest sub-group of migrant residents),34 a great many for-
eign residents in Spain do end up entering the peninsula 
after being apprehended on Spain’s southern border . After 
detention, a minority are repatriated (or sent to a third 
country), and a larger number sent to internment centres, 
from where they are released after forty days . Most are then 
taken to and released in mainland cities . In these cases, 
they remain under an unenforced expulsion order, which 
means that in the best of cases they cannot legalize their 
stay in the country for three years .35 Consequently they do 
not enjoy the legal protections that exist for legally resident 
citizens .
A study by Wayne Cornelius found that the legal quotas 
for hiring migrant labour outside Spain fell “far short” of 
demand; and that the “dysfunctional system of interlinked 
work to residential permits turns once legal workers into 
irregulares with dismaying regularity .”36 He says this “lim-
its [many migrant workers’] options to the underground 
economy or to formal-sector firms that employ them ‘off 
the books,’” and that the system “has been a great boon to 
employers: it has helped to institutionalize a system of short 
term hiring that gives them maximum flexibility to shed 
labor when it is not needed .”37 A further factor encouraging 
the illegalization of migrant labour is the Spanish State’s 
refugee policy: as well as being highly restrictive, it allows 
unsuccessful applicants three months to regularize their 
situation by obtaining work and visa permits, and, in the 
words of Cornelius, “the vast majority [ … ] simply dis-
appear into the underground economy .”38
Journalist and writer Xavier Rius Sant explains the 
inconsistency between the strictness and laxity of Spanish 
(and Italian) policy as a “paradox” caused by the European 
Union pressing the countries (to police their borders), and 
the need for each to reverse an acute aging of their popu-
lation .39 Another consideration is whether political gains 
can be made by parties that appear “strict on immigration” 
while simultaneously improving the potential for high rates 
of exploitation for Spanish capital .
An objection that might be made to the analysis made 
thus far is that there have been six large-scale “regulariza-
tions” since 1986,40 including a substantial process in 2005 
in which 700,000 persons benefited . The question arises 
as to whether this shows a willingness to avoid illegality . 
Philip Marfleet maintains otherwise, reminding us that 
such amnesties tend to become recurrent . This, he infers, is 
because they encourage continued entry by migrants in the 
hope that they might benefit from a future round of regular-
ization of status .41
There are two other factors that lend support to Marfleet’s 
analysis in the Iberian case . The first is that regularizations 
have excluded many people—800,000 from the beginning 
in the case of 2005, according to one estimate .42 Second, 
regularization made residence permits conditional on 
having work permits, meaning migrants’ legal residence 
became more dependent on the goodwill of their employer . 
If we accept that having precarious workers is a desired out-
come of government policy, as the previous discussion sug-
gests, this implies that paradoxically amnesties are another 
example of border control promoting a precarious labour 
force through illegality .
A final point concerns the enforcement of the laws 
against illegal hiring . Employers are rarely sanctioned 
for breaking these . An exceptional case (when a business-
man was arrested after the death of twelve undocumented 
Ecuadorians in a work-related driving accident in Lorca) 
was followed by 20,000 sackings, mainly of Ecuadorians, in 
just one region of Spain!43 The uniqueness of this example 
provides further evidence of a silent strategy to supply 
Spanish business with a large layer of undocumented labour . 
The result concurs with Saskia Sassen that border controls 
act to facilitate “the extraction of cheap labour by assigning 
criminal status to a segment of the working class .”44 They 
thus act as a “mould” helping create a new type of “Kleenex” 
(or disposable) worker .45
Impacts
In the years immediately prior to the crisis, employers and 
most of the media, alongside the governing Spanish Socialist 
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Party (PSOE) and smaller progressive and regional parties, 
have argued the “economic case” for migration . They have 
been supported in this by the economic studies mentioned 
above . Most studies maintained that migration had a negli-
gible impact on the availability of employment and had the 
“positive” effect of increasing flexibility and wage restraint . 
For example, Guillermo de la Dehesa, of the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, says immigrant labour encour-
ages “wage moderation and the flexibilisation of the labour 
market .”46 This echoes ideas put forward by economic lib-
erals internationally . For example, Alan Greenspan, while 
chairman of the US Federal Reserve, argued for US immi-
gration policies to be relaxed “for growth to be continued 
without inflation .”47
Such a backdrop may partly explain why anti-immigrant 
attitudes have gained greater currency in the Spanish work-
ers’ movement and sectors of the left .48 Sometimes these 
are “justified” by comparing migrant labour to that which 
Karl Marx termed the “reserve army of labour .” This work-
force, in the words of Albert Recio, acts as a “mechanism 
to suppress wage demands and discipline the working 
classes .”49 A CCOO national report subtitled “Proposals 
for the Regulation of Migratory Flows” writes, “having an 
important reserve army ‘flexibilises’ the job market, thanks 
to immigrant working people’s reduced costs—[social-
security] contributions and wages—, greater availability 
and less-demanding attitude towards legal compliance .”50 
Revealingly, almost all of the literature consulted for this 
paper referred to the Marxian concept .
Below I will carefully examine the validity of these 
descriptions by comparing them with the situation in the 
three sectors that have incorporated most (legal) migrant 
labour . These are (according to official Social Security statis-
tics): construction (376,732 employees), hospitality (210,801), 
and domestic service (157,192) .51 They are also sectors 
that have received significant research attention facili-
tating analysis . First, however, I shall make a few general 
observations .
Employment, “Precariedad,” and Wages
The aforementioned CCOO report states that the flexibility 
and cost reduction offered by migrant labour “are import-
ant incentives for companies to hire labour of foreign origin, 
even when there is no shortage of autochthonous labour, 
which produces undesired substitution processes .”52 A sim-
ilar idea is implied by the industrial relations analyst Albert 
Recio, who deduces that “substitution” must be occurring 
from the coexistence in Spain of continued high unemploy-
ment with the period of large-scale migration .
It is true that migrant wages in general are lower than those 
of autochthonous wage earners . According to the 2002 Wage 
Structure Survey male immigrant workers earned between 
7 .2 per cent and 16 .3 per cent less than male non-immigrant 
workers .53 Superficially this suggests that employers would 
have objective cause to prefer employment of immigrants 
(although at the same time it poses the question of whether 
employers are discriminating against migrants when hiring) . 
However, there are several reasons why we should be skep-
tical towards the substitution thesis .
The first is that the “unemployed” in Spain also include 
a relatively large number of people that work in “informal 
employment,” which Recio himself describes as having “a 
long tradition” in the territory .54 This means that the real 
levels of unemployment are likely to be significantly lower 
than official rate .55 Additionally, the widespread application 
of short-term contracts in the job market encourages work-
ers in general to intersperse employment with collecting 
unemployment compensation (“el paro”) . The above factors 
have meant that in some provinces it is estimated that 60 to 
70 per cent of residents are signing on and not looking for 
legal employment .56
Another weakness with the substitution thesis is that 
(during the pre-crisis years) the percentage of nationals 
employed increased faster than the percentage of migrants 
hired (between 2002 and 2006 up 4 .3 per cent in the for-
mer case; 3 .3 per cent in the case of migrants .)57 Carlota 
Solé explains that the overall pattern “is not about activities 
being ‘vacated’ by autochthonous workers but by labour 
shortages in certain sectors/segments/geographical areas .”58 
This conclusion receives support from the fact that two of 
the sectors that incorporated the most immigrants during 
the last decade—construction and tourism—were the fast-
est growing in economic terms . Construction, for example, 
rose from representing 11 .7 per cent to 15 .7 per cent of all 
GDP between 1997 and 2007,59 which is an abnormally high 
percentage and rate of growth . It is difficult to envisage that 
the corresponding demand for skilled and unskilled labour-
ers in this sector could have been met without large-scale 
use of migrant labour .
Solé also identified “an important shift upwards” in the 
“level of acceptance” of job quality by non-migrant labour .60 
A recent local example would appear to lend support for this 
interpretation . At the start of the recession, the government 
contacted 2,034 unemployed Spanish nationals in Huelva to 
be given precedence for 25,000 local harvesting jobs . Out 
of those contacted, only 260 attended an interview and 32 
accepted the job .61
The above reflections contradict any strong substitu-
tion thesis, yet they cannot rule out any substitution tak-
ing place . There are employment branches that effectively 
have become “migrant-only,” including unpleasant and/
or low-paid work such as live-in domestic service and 
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the greenhouse farming already referred to . Some liber-
als, such as Nigel Harris, maintain that they are often sec-
tors that would not thrive otherwise,62 a view that overlaps 
with Abrams and Piore’s “segmentation” thesis, according 
to which competition only occurs when migrants settle 
and leave migrant-only professions .63 These ideas are not 
totally inaccurate: for example, non-immigrants, particu-
larly those with families, find the unsociable hours preva-
lent in the hospitality sector problematic; whilst new arriv-
als without families and reduced social networks find them 
less so . At the same time, the segmentation perspective 
suffers from two shortcomings . Firstly, and most import-
antly, it legitimizes abnormal labour relations based on 
super-exploitation . Secondly, it is mistaken to think that 
there are no sectors where in the absence of new labour 
sources, wages and conditions would not be encouraged 
to rise to attract wage earners .64 Some employment sec-
tors could have increased fixed capital investments and 
thus reduced labour requirements, and others could have 
relocated production abroad . However, it is unlikely that 
these are viable options for the sectors employing most 
migrant labour—all of which are low capital intensive and 
geographically limited .
A second issue is whether migrants be deemed respon-
sible for the expansion of fixed-term contracts in Spain 
(or to use the commonly used Castilian term precariedad) . 
Here historical and economic evidence implies other-
wise . Precarious conditions were widespread among the 
Spanish workforce many years before large-scale immigra-
tion started in Spain . Indeed, as a result of controversial 
“labour reforms” performed by an earlier PSOE government 
led by Felipe González, by the early 1990s, when migrants 
were a tiny percentage of the population, approximately 40 
per cent of Spanish workers were employed “temporarily” 
(in practice having a chain of fixed-term contracts for the 
same post) . This is a slightly higher percentage than today . 
Further, according to CCOO, the proportion of insecure 
contracts within a profession is above average in many areas 
employing low or even negligible numbers of migrant work-
ers . Migrant workers are more likely to be on such contracts 
(65 per cent of all migrant workers in 2004), yet so are other 
social groups that have entered the workforce more recently, 
such as young people and women .65 
In short, there is little evidence of substitution of native 
workers by foreign workers, and while migrants suffer dis-
proportionately from precariedad, they can in no way be 
held responsible for its extension among Spanish workers .
A theoretical justification for the “reserve army of labour” 
thesis offered by Martínez Veiga is (citing the words of Borjas) 
the “law of supply and demand” whereby “an increase in 
the relative amount of people with a certain qualification is 
going to reduce their relative wages .”66 However, Martínez 
Veiga acknowledges that often qualifications are “fictitious” 
as migrants are forced, due to discrimination and lack of 
recognition of qualifications, to accept jobs below their true 
level of qualification, leading to an artificial concentra-
tion of migrant workers at the lower end of the job market . 
Opposing such discrimination is something that can and 
should be tackled within a No Borders strategy . Another 
inadequacy with Martínez Veiga’s application of Marx’s 
concept is that it overstates the extent to which wages are 
determined through labour supply and demand, and down-
plays the role that union activity can play in defending and 
improving wages and conditions .
Construction
In 2007 Miguel Pajares investigated the effects of migra-
tion on labour by studying the evolution of wage rates set 
in the “convenios” (binding wage agreements negotiated 
between union representatives and employers) in sec-
tors with a high degree of migrant labour . He also com-
pared the evolution of wages in a period with a low level 
of migration (1996–2000) compared to one with a much 
higher level (2001–2006) . In the construction industry he 
found that convenio wage rates in the later period increased 
more than in other sectors (by 24 per cent, between 2000 
and 2006, compared to 21 .4 per cent across all employ-
ment sectors) . Furthermore, although the proportion 
of migrants in the building workforce rose sharply from 
5 .2 per cent of total in the earlier period, to 19 .7 per cent 
in the later, convenio wage levels rose at the same rate in 
both! At a glimpse, this would appear to provide good evi-
dence against any negative-effect thesis . Nevertheless, the 
OPI research directed by Carmen González-Enríquez pro-
vides observations that require us to give a more nuanced 
interpretation . The investigation, based on interviews with 
national, regional, and local trade union leaders, and focus 
group studies with different groups of unionized and non-
unionized workers, suggested that employers had regularly 
paid their employees above-convenio rates, often paying 
the complements “cash-in-hand,” but that these were some-
times not demanded by migrant workers . The OPI found 
that migrant workers “did not know the Spanish regula-
tions or are in an irregular situation,” which on occasions 
led them to accept convenio rates . At the same time, Pajares 
himself identified an increasing tendency for migrant and 
other workers to work for subcontracting companies that 
applied an inferior convenio (from an alternative sector to 
construction) or no convenio at all;67 and the OPI report 
found that subcontracting coexisted on the same sites as 
more regulated and stable employment, sometimes giving 
rise to conflict . 68
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Treatment of migrant construction workers as “precar-
ious,” as is commonly assumed, may be overstated . In fact 
one report identifies only half as working under fixed-term 
contracts (a figure only slightly above the average for all 
employees in all sectors) .69 Additionally, the large-scale 
entry of migrants in the lower ranks of the labour force 
has led to the promotion of significant numbers of native 
employees within the industry .70 In this (limited) sense 
native earnings and conditions are likely to have improved! 
(Nevertheless, it should be noted that this may take place at 
the expense of better-qualified migrant labour .)
Hospitality
In hospitality, which includes bars, restaurants, and hotels 
and which is (officially) the second biggest employer of 
migrant labour, a similar pattern emerges with regard to 
the convenios . In the sector, binding wage rates have also 
increased faster than in general (from 2000 to 2006 this 
was by 23 .5 per cent—mildly lower than in construction 
and higher than the 21 .4 per cent wage increase enjoyed by 
Spanish workers in general) . Again, despite the proportion 
of migrant workers increasing by over 150 per cent (from 
10 .1 per cent of total wage earners to 24 .5 per cent) from the 
1996–2000 period to the 2001–2006 period, pay levels grew 
at the same rate in both . This suggests no weakening in the 
legal bargaining power of workplaces organized through 
union structures . Again some native workers benefited from 
promotion .71 In the restaurants and bar chains of this sector, 
there was a reported absence of conflict between migrant 
and native workers . Less information is available about the 
reality in smaller family businesses where wage earners are 
less likely to be unionized, and this may mean limits to the 
applicability of the above analysis . A final observation is that 
there has also been a (declining) tendency to discriminate 
against migrants by employing them in posts hidden from 
the public .72
Domestic Service
Domestic service, which includes housekeeping, child care, 
and care of the elderly, is a more problematic area in terms of 
pinpointing effects on wages . While we know that in “home 
help” services, which are often managed by local authorities, 
convenios are respected and there is little illegal hiring, in 
the more traditional domestic service, in which domestics 
are hired individually by employers, there is an absence of 
convenios, poor regulation,73 and very low levels of union-
ization .74 Consequently studies using union sources have 
little concrete information on the sector . We do know from 
other research, including Carlota Solé’s interviews with 
migrant domestic workers and a variety of research on 
Dominican women migrants, that this female-dominated 
sector has transformed significantly in the last few decades . 
Previously it centred on the hiring of native Spanish women 
that had migrated from rural areas, whereas now the vast 
majority of domestics are migrant . While in 1985 only 7 per 
cent of domestic workers “lived in,” now most do . A further 
change is that due to the expansion of the domestic service 
market a great many employers today are “middle-class” 
families with two wage earners, as opposed to high-income 
elite families (a shift that could have a depressive effect on 
wages and conditions due to the generally lower incomes of 
employers) . Large numbers of domestics are undocumented 
migrant women,75 which became visible when a year after 
the government’s 2005 regularization process, the total 
Table 1: Evolution of foreign workers in the labour markets employing most migrants
January 
2004
January 
2005
growth in 
2004 (%)
January 
2006
growth in 
2005 (%)
January 
2007
growth in 
2006 (%)
construction 155,108 187,097 (20.6) 311,281 (66.3) 376,732 (21.0)
hospitality 112,826 131,013 (16.1) 188,682 (44.0) 210,801 (11.7)
domestic 
service
72,361 77,098 (5.2) 247,874 (221.5) 183,174 (-26.1)
retail and 
business
85,433 103,350 (21.0) 151,098 (46.2) 174,494 (15.5)
other busi-
ness 
activities
76,953 98,480 (25.4) 130,353 (35.1) 167,376 (28.4)
agriculture 120,928 113,768 (-5.8) 163,290 (43.5) 157,912 (-3.3)
Source: from the Labour Statistics Gazette and Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration, cited in Miguel Pajares, 
“Inmigración y mercado de trabajo . Informe 2007 . Análisis de datos de España y Catalunya,” online: http://www .tt .mtas .es/periodico/
inmigracion/200706/informe .pdf (accessed 9 July 2010 .) .
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number of domestic employees affiliated to the social secur-
ity system increased by 221 .5 per cent over the previous year 
(from 77,098 to 247,874 persons) . Table 1 shows that this 
increase had no relation with either the years before or after 
the process, and little relation with any other employment 
sector, which would suggest that migrant domestic labour is 
much more extensive than official figures would imply .
A further relevant finding from research is that domestics 
often leave behind families and aim to save money to take 
back to them after a short period or use their job as an entry 
point to access others in the country .76 As a result many 
change profession after renewing their work permit .77 
A first crucial issue with regard to domestic employ-
ment is that the many accounts dealing with it agree that 
wages have fallen in this sector . One study, performed by 
the European Industrial Relations Observatory, calculated 
that monthly wages of domestics in Spain suffered a sharp 
drop from $600-$720 to $360-$540 at the beginning of the 
decade .78 This is a finding which contrasts significantly with 
those of the other sectors examined .
Summary and Explanations
Let us summarize our findings thus far: we have shown 
that in construction and hospitality the incorporation of 
migrants into the labour force in Spain has responded to 
the labour shortages that existed before the current crisis . 
Union agreements do not appear to have been weakened 
by the large-scale entry of migrant labour in these sectors, 
However, the tendency towards subcontracting (through 
which other subsections of workers are employed as well 
as migrants) and the reduction in informal bonuses due to 
lack of information has had some negative effects on labour 
conditions . A counteracting effect is that the working con-
ditions of some non-immigrant employees have improved 
as they have been promoted to higher grades . In the two 
industries there is a lack of evidence of significant substitu-
tion taking place, at least in the larger unionized workplaces . 
These discoveries contrast with “common sense” thinking 
on impacts .
Yet with domestic labour the pattern is different .79 Here 
the transformations in the sector, including the modifica-
tions in the social class of employers, have been accompan-
ied by a significant lowering of pay and conditions, and it 
cannot be ruled out that this acts as a disincentive to non-
migrants seeking occupation in the sector .
The above results indicate that it is at best over-simplis-
tic to claim, as do the major unions, that immigration is 
favoured by the government and employers because it weak-
ens employment security and pay .80 Rather, as Toby Shelley 
contends, “Within an overall context of filling vacancies 
and doing so inexpensively, the precise reasons for turning 
to migrant labour vary from sector to sector and from seg-
ment to segment within sectors .”81 It is also highly question-
able to maintain, as Martínez Veiga does (again adapting 
ideas from Borjas), “that immigration redistributes wealth 
from labour to capital .”82
Lastly, the comparison with the “reserve army of labour” 
theory, which originally Marx used to describe the urban 
unemployed that had migrated from the English countryside 
to the cities (thus “competing” with the new industrial pro-
letariat for jobs), is of questionable use, bearing in mind that 
migrants generally did not enter Spain until jobs became 
available and would thus have had little leverage effect on 
the native employed . The idea that migrants are the source of 
precarious employment is historically flawed .
Our findings so far echo those of the international lit-
erature on effects, which while divergent cluster around 
“little” or “no” impact, even in the case of intense migration 
processes . According to calculations by George Borjas in 
the early 1990s using a range of US research, an increase 
in migration of 10 per cent would affect wages by between 
0 .02 per cent and 0 .03 per cent—a negligible amount . Other 
studies have found that there can be temporary negative 
effects on unskilled social groups .83
At the same time as recognizing that claimed impacts are 
exaggerated, we can infer from our results that it is incorrect 
to talk in terms of homogeneous effects of migration on 
wages and conditions . Instead, effects vary, being mediated 
through a series of other considerations . Concretely, in the 
light of the evidence presented on the varying effects on dif-
ferent branches of labour, we can venture that effects vary 
on a positive and negative continuum according to the fol-
lowing factors:
•	 the relative prominence of irregular employment (of 
undocumented workers),
•	 union organization and influence among the 
workforce,
•	 the degree of information migrants have about their 
rights,
•	 the degree to which migrants are free from dis-
crimination and to which their real qualifications are 
recognized .
It can be argued that this provisional list of factors weighs 
far more heavily on outcomes than any “innate” character-
istics of migration, such as (as is sometimes argued) that 
the newness of migrants makes them more predisposed to 
accepting worse pay and conditions .84
Most crucially we have shown that a high degree of 
illegality, for example among domestics, is associated with 
lower wage rates, and even the “possibility” of substitution . 
This finding confirms Teresa Hayter’s observation that one 
of the few conclusive findings on the economics of migrant 
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labour is that negative effects will be greatest under condi-
tions of “illegality .”85
One final point is that although the incorporation of 
migrant labour in the workplace does not have important 
downward effects on labour conditions, this does not pre-
vent employers and decision-makers from hoping for other-
wise . While a more exhaustive examination of this discrep-
ancy would be desirable, we can tentatively suggest that this 
may be due to an over-reliance on economic explanations of 
behaviour (e .g ., supply and demand in the labour market) 
and an underestimation of the capacity of migrant and non-
migrant labour to shape labour outcomes through mobility 
and industrial action .
Unions and Borders
In recent years there has been a hardening of attitude 
towards migration among the leaderships of the main 
Spanish trade unions . Most notably, the largest federation, 
CCOO, has, according to the OPI, “evolved” from a pos-
ition “based on the principles of international solidarity” to 
one that also advocates “controlled immigration” (reducing 
entry and illegal employment) . This bifurcation means that 
as well as continuing to give advice on regularization and 
family regroupment, through its migrant services section, 
the union federation also calls for an increase in workplace 
inspections and “reducing irregular immigration .”86
Within this paradigmatic shift, CCOO, alongside the 
UGT, has recently opposed government job-seeking visa 
schemes to ease entry into the country, and lobbied suc-
cessfully with employers’ organizations in 2007 for a mora-
torium on the free circulation of workers from the new EU 
states of Romania and Bulgaria .87 A reported outcome of 
the latter was that the large Romanian population in the 
peninsula continued to grow but that new migrants had to 
work “illegally .”88
It could be argued that the unions’ stance has become 
increasingly schizophrenic: on the one hand acting to 
increase migrants’ rights; on the other, effectively collabor-
ating in their exclusion and criminalization .
My examination offers many examples that show why 
the unions’ current perspective is mistaken, in terms of the 
effects it will have on both migrant workers and the wider 
working class . My findings back those analyses that propose 
a radically different union perspective that treats organizing 
migrant labour as a priority of the trade-union movement, 
and seeks to increase membership, representation, and sup-
port of migrants, while having as a goal the equalization of 
wages and conditions between migrant and non-migrant . 
Toby Shelley, who has developed a bleaker vision regarding 
the labour-market effects of migration in the British con-
text, poses the issue in similar albeit more negative terms, 
commenting, “If [migrant workers] are being used to drive 
down wages and conditions … that is all the more reason 
to devote time, effort and solidarity in defending them .”89
There is little concrete data on migrant involvement in 
union structures, but that which is available demonstrates 
that participation is very limited . In April 2004 only 3 .7 per 
cent of the membership and 1 per cent of the shop stewards 
of CCOO were “foreign .” According to the OPI report, these 
figures do not show a lack of interest in joining unions, an 
idea which they support by highlighting that most immi-
grants in Spain originate from places with a strong tradition 
of union organization (e .g ., Latin America) . They add that in 
some sectors and subsectors immigrants already represent 
the largest pool of potential new recruits for the unions .90
Some progressive developments have emerged recently 
from within the major union federations, such as the provi-
sion of courses for migrant workers on rights and language 
skills .91 Nevertheless, far more could be done .
Positive examples could be learned from the experiences 
of other workers’ organizations internationally . In Britain, 
for example, the umbrella Trade Union Congress (TUC) has 
subsumed its “migrant” strategy into a broader program of 
tackling vulnerability . TUC representatives judge that this 
has led unions “to deal with the [temporary-work] agency 
question and not just the migrant question,” as well as “to 
move the argument off of migration status and deflect the 
‘us-and-them’ comments .” Polish-speaking regional organ-
izers have been created, in part through collaboration with 
the Polish trade-union federation Solidarnosc, and there have 
been attempts to recruit to British unions in Poland itself!92
There appears to be no reason why these creative initia-
tives and others could not be applied successfully in the 
Spanish context, and why the union movement as a whole 
could not give greater commitment to migrant workers . 
Indeed smaller radical unions, such as the anarcho-syndical-
ist CGT, have shown a marked commitment to defending 
migrant rights—leading several local occupations and dem-
onstrations in favour of regularization under the slogan 
“¡papeles para todos!” (“documents for everyone!”) .93
In the early 1960s when Spain industrialized rapidly, 
millions of people left the countryside (especially in the 
south of Spain) to work in the factories, building sites, and 
bars of Madrid, Barcelona, the Basque Country, and the 
Balearic Isles . In their new surroundings, where in some 
cases they were labelled “immigrants,”94 they were subject 
to complaints for their willingness to work large amounts 
of overtime at lower wages .95 Nonetheless, by the mid-sev-
enties these very groups were playing a leading part in the 
new union movement against Franco, articulated princi-
pally through the then-clandestine and grassroots CCOO 
movement .96
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Immigrant workers today in Spain are sometimes 
treated as being of a different disposition to these past 
waves of migrants, and are frequently referred to in popular, 
union, and academic contexts as “passive” or even “docile .” 
Jorge Verstrynge and his co-writers dismissively describe 
migrants as “submissive labour .”97 These characteriza-
tions are contradicted by the recent history of struggle by 
migrant workers: along with the aforementioned strikes at 
El Ejido, migrants held 700 church occupations and hunger 
strikes in 2001, and have led several mass protests against 
racist attacks and tightening of immigration controls .98 We 
might add to this that the kind of measures promoted by 
Verstrynge, G . Sánchez Medero, and R . Sánchez Medero, 
the union leaderships, and the OPI are precisely those that 
encourage passivity, by legally “tying the hands” of migrant 
labour .
Conclusion
Migrants should not be encouraged just to be the object of 
trade union and political activity but to be its subject . Only 
such an approach, combined with active opposition to con-
trols, can prevent migrant employment being instrumental-
ized to produce “social dumping .” This is not an abstract 
desire: among contract cleaners, a relatively high level of 
union mobilization coincides with a reported lack of div-
ision and undercutting among this mixed (migrant/non-
migrant) workforce .99
A final note is that the above conclusion is of greater 
importance under the current economic crisis, which has 
been particularly pronounced in Spain . As a result of labour 
market shrinkage there has been a notable decrease in eco-
nomic “defences” of migration . Furthermore, there has been 
a “hardening” in government immigration policy, as exem-
plified by the introduction in 2008 of the Early Payment of 
Benefits to Foreigners Program . This “encouraged” jobless 
migrants to voluntarily return to their countries of origin 
in exchange for early unemployment benefit payments, and 
widely has been interpreted as signalling an anti-immigra-
tion stance .100
There is a consensus in the literature and in political 
circles that Spain, like other Mediterranean countries, is 
suffering from substantial demographic decline . In 1999 the 
fertility rate had fallen to a historic and international low 
of 1 .07 children per woman of fertile age .101 This figure has 
risen slightly since, partly as a response to higher birth rates 
among immigrant women . One recent calculation is that if 
no more immigrants enter the country, there will be a mil-
lion fewer sixteen- to sixty-four-year-olds by the early 2020s, 
and that the number of sixteen- to thirty-nine-year-olds 
shall decrease by a third .102 This reality, together with the 
possibility of deepened crisis and instability in the global 
South, shall ensure that migrants shall continue to arrive 
in Spain . A twin No Borders and migrant-orientated union 
strategy offers the guarantee that this will benefit all work-
ing people .
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